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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Reimbursement of Utility Relocation Costs. In 1959 the state
legislature passed a law enabling Washington to obtain federal-aid
highway grants for the reimbursement of utility relocation costs inci-
dent to federal highway construction.1 In the recent case of Washing-
ton St. Hy. Comm'n. v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co.,2 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held this legislation to violate the state constitution.
As an incident to highway construction, utilities are often required
to remove and relocate their facilities. In the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1958, Congress recognized this problem and approved the
granting of federal funds to states which reimburse utilities for such
costs.' States were not eligible for these funds if such reimbursement
was contrary to state law or violated contractual relations between
the utilities and the states.'
Under previous Washington law utilities were required to remove
equipment at their own expense when removal was deemed necessary
for public safety, highway construction, or the like.5 To make Wash-
ington eligible for federal funds, the 1959 legislature eliminated this
requirement where the state was entitled to at least 90% reimburse-
ment from the federal government.6 The Washington State Highway
Commission and the Director of Highways initiated a declaratory
judgment action against three public utilities to have this 1959 legis-
I Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 330, § 2, RCW 47.44.030.
2 59 Wn.2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961).
3 "When a State shall pay for the cost of relocation of utility facilities necessitated
by the construction of a project of the Federal-aid primary or secondary systems or on
the Interstate System, including extentions thereof within urban areas, Federal funds
may be used to reimburse the State for such cost in the same proportion as Federal
funds are expended on the project .. " 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1958).
' "Federal funds shall not be used to reimburse the State under this section when
payment to the utility violates the law of the State or violates a legal contract be-
tween the utility and the State." 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1958).
5 Wash. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 53, § 84 (now RCW 47.44.020, as amended, Wash.
Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 330, § 1) provided: "Such franchise shall be made subject to
removal when necessary for the construction, alteration, repair or improvement of
such primary state highway and at the expense of the person, firm, corporation or
municipal corporation holding such franchise."
6 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 330, § 2, RCW 47.44.030: "Provided, That notwith-
standing any contrary provision of law or any existing or future franchise held by a
public utility, the state highway commission shall pay or reimburse the owner for
relocation or removal of any publicly, privately or cooperatively owned public utility
facilities when necessitated by the construction, reconstruction, relocation or im-
provement of a highway which is part of the national system of interstate and defense
highways for each item of cost for which the state shall be entitled to be reimbursed
by the United States in an amount equal to at least ninety percent thereof under the
provisions of section 123, Federal Aid Highway Act of 1958, and any other subsequent
act of congress under which the state shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the United
States in an amount equal to at least ninety percent of the cost of relocation of
utility facilities on said national system of interstate and defense highways." (It
should be noted at this point that the statute does not specify the fund or funds from
which the monies may be taken.)
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lation declared unconstitutional. Judgment in the lower court upheld
the law's constitutionality, and the state appealed.
The court held the law unconstitutional on multiple grounds. It first
found that the cost of utility relocation was not an expenditure "ex-
clusively for highway purposes." Therefore, payment of such costs
from the state motor vehicle fund would violate Amendment 18 of
the Washington Constitution.
Secondly, the court held such payments could not be sustained
because to do so would violate the positive mandate of Article VIII,
section 5, prohibiting the giving or loaning of the state's credit to
private entities.
Finally, the majority rejected a contention that even if such reim-
bursement did constitute a gift (loaning of credit), it would be justi-
fied as the furtherance of a public purpose.
The court held that to take reimbursement money from the state
motor vehicle fund would violate Amendment 18 of the Washington
Constitution, which limits expenditures to items "exclusively for high-
way purposes." In finding that utility relocation was not "exclusively
for highway purposes" the court had little Washington case law on
which to rely.
Only twice before had the Washington court construed the scope of
this limitation. State ex rel. Bugge v. Martin held that motor vehicle
funds could properly be used to retire the bonds on the Agate Pass
bridge. In Automobile Club of Washington v. City of Seattle,' satis-
faction of a tort judgment arising from the negligent operation of a
bridge was found to be outside the realm of exclusive highway pur-
poses. And, nearly a year after the decision in the instant case, the
court held that motor vehicle funds could be used in a guarantee fund
for toll bridge and ferry system revenue bonds.9
While not in direct or apparent conflict with the other decisions,
738 Wn2d 834, 232 P.2d 833 (1951).
8 55 Wn.2d 161, 346 P2d 695 (1959).
0 State ex rel Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 161 Wash. Dec. 26,
377 P.2d 466 (1962). A mandamus action was brought to compel the state auditor
to sign certain refunding bonds. The action was resisted on numerous technical
grounds, some of which have peculiar interest, but are not related to the present
discussion. For example: the jurisdiction of the supreme court in mandamus actions,
the constitutionality of statutes involving more than one subject, the conversion of
revenue bonds into general obligation bonds, and the constitutionality of extending
appropriations beyond the next biennium.
After resolving the above matters in favor of the plaintiff, the court proceeded to
sanction the use of motor vehicle funds in a special account to guarantee toll bridge
and ferry system revenue bonds. Since bridges and ferries were considered integral




the present result is arguably more strict than what might have been
anticipated from the language of the Automobile Club case. There the
intent of Amendment 18 was said to be the limitation of expenditures
to those purposes which would "directly or indirectly benefit the high-
way system."'
0
Furthermore, the language of Bugge v. Martin states that the per-
missible acts enumerated by Amendment 18 tend to enlarge the ordi-
nary meaning of "highway purposes."" It is therefore mildly surpris-
ing that the court reached such a strict result when past decisions
would have allowed a much more liberal construction.
The court, however, apparently felt that the word "exclusively"
controlled and on that ground refused to follow numerous other juris-
dictions which had considered utility relocation a legitimate highway
purpose.' As a result, Washington is in a minority on this issue.
The case raises another interesting issue in terms of the presumptive
constitutionality of legislative enactments. If doubt appears as to
whether a law conforms to constitutional provisions, previous Wash-
ington cases have held that a presumption arises in favor of its validity,
with a burden on the complainant "to clearly establish its invalidity."' 13
The court disposed of this point rather summarily by saying, "The
presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional is overcome,
where, as here, there is no constitutional provision to support it."'"
Doctrinally the state constitution circumscribes rather than enumer-
ates state power, so this approach is unusual. Practically, it is un-
certain from the opinion just how much "support" a law needs before
it receives presumptive validity. It does seem clear, however, that
10 Automobile Club of Washington v. City of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 161, 168, 346 P.2d
695, 700 (1959).
11 State ex rel. Bugge v. Martin, 38 Wn.2d 834, 840, 232 P.2d 833, 836 (1951).
12E.g.: "[R]elocation of utility facilities is an integral part of highway improve-
ment." Opinion of Justices, 101 N.H. 527, 132 A2d 613, 616 (1957). "It would be
unreasonable to hold that the proceeds of the highway fund may not be expended
for whatever is reasonably necessary to complete accomplishment of all the basic
purposes for which a highway exists." Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn.
164, 91 N.W.2d 642, 649 (1958) "[A]s the expression would be commonly understood,
'expense of such construction' would include the cost of the necessary relocation of
utilities." Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 185
Pa. Super. 1, 136 A.2d 473, 479 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 145 A.2d 538. "The
public thus has a direct and immediate interest in the relocation of utility facilities
which would otherwise interfere with highway improvements .. " State v. City of
Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737, 745 (1960). Accord, Jones v. Burns, 138 Mont.
268, 357 P.2d 22 (1960), Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W2d 245
(N.D. 1960). Contra, Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S.E.2d 268 (1957); Opinion
of Justices, 152 Maine 449, 132 A.2d 440 (1957). But cf., In re Opinion of Justices, 324
Mass. 746, 85 N.E.2d 761 (1949).
13 Gruen v. Tax Commissioner, 35 Wn.2d 1, 6, 211 P.2d 651, 655 (1949). Accord,
State v. Hanlen, 193 Wash. 494, 76 P.2d 316 (1938).
14 59 Wn.2d at 222, 367 P.2d at 609-
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the court will not be easily disposed to rely on presumptions, even
where, as here, there is ample room for debate.
The second major ground on which the court rejected constitution-
ality deals with the limitations of Article VIII, section 5. The utilities
argued that even if money could not be taken from the motor vehicle
fund, payment from the general fund would be justified as an exercise
of the police power to promote the welfare of the community.
Actually, police power need not even have been mentioned here. If
the expenditure in question would have violated a constitutional man-
date, no further inquiry was required. Normally, a state is presumed
to have power except where specifically restricted (as, for example,
by the constitution). The reference to police power, therefore, added
only confusion. In any event, the court rejected this argument by
the utilities.
Quoting Shea v. Olson,:5 it pointed out that one limitation on police
power is that it may not violate a direct or positive mandate of the
constitution. As the court had already determined that the law would
violate Amendment 18, it then considered the validity of an expendi-
ture from the general fund, and concluded that reimbursement of the
utilities would constitute a gift. As such, it would violate Article VIII
section 5 of the Washington Constitution, which prohibits the giving
or loaning of the state's credit to private entities." Once again the
court disposed of the problem with brevity, citing only one case."
But the respondent utilities, with whom Judge Hunter agreed in his'
dissent, argued that the purpose of Article VIII, section 5 is to pro-
hibit funds from benefiting private interests where a public purpose is
not primarily served. Since the expenditure in this case is made for a
public purpose,"s it is therefore not a "gift" in violation of the consti-
tutional provisions.
The seven-judge majority, however, did not accept this argument.
Citing cases from New Mexico' 9 and Ohio, ° they concluded that since
15 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615, 619, 3 A.L.R. 998 (1936).1' WASH. CONST., art. 8, § 5: "The credit of the state shall not, in any manner
be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation."
17 State v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Yaldma, 20 Wn.2d 588, 148 P.2d 323 (1944).
I The argument that reimbursement serves a public purpose is based on a theory
of economic benefit to the community. It is argued that if utilities are required to
pay the substantial relocation costs the price will be passed on to the consumer. In
addition, if reimbursement with federal funds is not allowed, Washington taxpayers
will be paying the costs in other states and realizing none of the benefits.
19 State Highway Comm'n v. Southern Union Gas Co., 65 N.M. 84, 332 P.2d 1007(1958), overruled by, State ex rel. Albuquerque v. Lavender, 69 N.M. 220, 365 P.2d
652 (1961).2 0 City of Cincinnati v. Harth, 101 Ohio St. 344, 128 N.E. 263 (1920).
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utilities are privately owned, they do not perform a state purpose.2 '
(The New Mexico case was subsequently overruled on this point.2 2 )
They further concluded that engaging in a public purpose activity does
not of itself entitle utilities to be reimbursed for their operating costs.
This result presents a problem. The respondents argued that a gift
is justified for a public purpose. Judge Ott's majority opinion, how-
ever, stresses that a state purpose is not served since the utilities are
privately owned. The inference seems to be that a state purpose is to
be distinguished from a public purpose and that a state purpose will be
found only where the state owns and operates the facility. The fact
that a public purpose is served is apparently immaterial so long as the
operation is owned by a private entity. The logical result seems to be
that state funds or credit can never be given to a private body. It is
questionable whether the court meant to confine state power within
such narrow limits.
Judge Hunter's dissent points out that utilities have always been
granted free use of state highways. In light of this fact, there is some
question as to the consistency of the court's holding that reimburse-
ment of costs violates Article VIII, section 5, and is not justified as a
furtherance of a public purpose. Does not the grant of free use of
state property have the attributes of a gift? Although the general fund
is not directly decreased, the recipient is gratuitously benefited, and
the justification must be public service. The only apparent distinction
between reimbursement and granting free use of property is that the
former directly affects the general fund by decreasing it, while the
latter does not. The distinction seems unconvincing, however, when
reduced to the difference between paying money out of a fund and
granting immunity from contributing to it. In either case the fund is
affected. The distinction is even less convincing when federal reim-
bursement enters the picture.
This decision does not indicate that the court will invoke the pro-
tections of Article VIII, section 5 only when a payment is made directly
out of state funds, and not when state credit is loaned indirectly. It
does appear, however, that there is an element of inconsistency in the
court's attitude toward the problem-inconsistency caused by uncer-
tainty over where to draw the line between illegal benefits to private
entities and benefits which are justified in furtherance of a public
purpose.
21 59 Wn.2d at 224, 367 P.2d at 610.
22 State ex rel. Albuquerque v. Lavender, 69 N.M. 220, 365 P.2d 652 (1961).
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Judge Hunter stresses the purpose of the constitutional provisions
-to protect against benefit to private parties at public expense. If
this be correct, private bodies might receive gifts or privileges when
the result would be to contribute primarily to the public welfare. He
suggests this on the theory that the benefits derived by the public are
a sufficient consideration for the "gift" or grant.23
In any case, the fact that utilities have been granted free use of the
highways suggests that some gratuitous benefits-whether they be
privileges, immunities, gifts, or loaned credit-have been justified
when a public purpose is served. It is, of course, difficult to draw the
line between public purpose and private advantage, especially when
they are so often intermixed. The present decision, however, provides
little help in defining that line.
WAYNE BOOTH, JR.
CONTRACTS
Promissory Estoppel-Forbearance. The Washington court in
Weitman v. Grange Ins. Ass'n.,1 enforced a gratuitious promise by a
promisor-insurer that it would notify the promisee-insured of any lapse
or termination in his insurance coverage.
The promisee had the policy in his possession and thus knew the date
upon which the policy was to terminate. The date of termination
passed, but because of the insurer's promise the insured-promisee failed
to procure insurance which was available from another source. The
court held that the insured had not only relied in fact upon his insurer's
promise, but also that he had been legally entitled to do so. Con-
sequently the insurer was obligated to pay for fire loss occuring after
the policy's termination date. The court stressed the fact that the
promisor had on two prior occasions notified the promisee that his
insurance coverage was suspended. It had little difficulty in determin-
ing that on the date of policy termination the promisee could again
rely on the promised notice.
The Weitman decision suggests that the Washington court may have
23 State Highway Comm'n v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wn2d 216, 227,
367 P.2d 605, 612 (1961) (dissenting opinion) ; State ex rel. Tattersal v. Yelle, 52
Wn.2d 856, 329 P2d 841 (1958).
159 Wn.2d 748, 370 P2d 587 (1962).
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